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NOTES
PECUNIARY INTEREST OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
IN FINAL TRIAL OF A MISDEMEANOR IN KENTUCKYVIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AIENDMENT
In 1927, the Supreme Court of the United States m Tumey
v Oho' held that a defendant who was tried by the mayor of a
city for a misdemeanor in which, on conviction, a material part
of the fine and costs went to the mayor as a fee for his services
in so presiding, he getting no fee in the event of an acquittal,
was thereby deprived of the protection of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said
"

we conclude, that a system by which an in-

ferior judge is paid for his services only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by
custom in the general practice either at common law or
in this country that it can be regarded as due process
of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small
that they may be properly ignored
as within the maxim
De minmis non curat lex.''
The Court pointed out that this practice prevailed m
Arkansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio,
and Texas.
At the time of the above decision, a Kentucky statute'
provided that county judges, city or police judges, and justices
of the peace were entitled to certain costs for services rendered
in their respective courts and as far as those services applied
when the jurisdiction was concurrent with the eireiut courts
they were entitled to charge and receive the same fees allowed
by law to clerks of circuit courts for similar services. Circuit
court clerks were entitled to receive 10% of all fines and
forfeitures received in their respective courts' and as a consequence, county judges and justices of the peace in addition
to the costs, were thereby entitled to 10% of all fines recovered
'273 U. S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).

'U.

S. CONST. AMEND. XIV

'273 U. S.510, 531, 71 L. Ed. 749, 758, 47 Sup. Ct. 437, Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 1731.
'Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 1721.

(1927).
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in their courts and paid into the state treasury in cases whereof
the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction.' City or police
judges in cities of all classes were not entitled to this 10% of
fines or the costs recovered in their court as they were required
to pay into the city treasury all fines and costs collected in
criminal cases' and received a salary in lieu of the statutory
fees.' Therefore, at that time the county judges and justices
of the peace were affected by the above decision.
About nine months after the Tumey decision, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was confronted with Wagers v Sizemore,' in
which the petitioner had sought an injunction in the circuit
court against a justice of the peace to enjoin the justice from
issuing a capiaspro fine against him. The petitioner alleged that
he had been arrested on a warrant for obstructing the highway
and brought before the justice of the peace, that he had objected
to trial before the justice on the ground that the justice was
pecuniarily interested in the case and would receive a portion of
the fine as well as the costs in the event of conviction, that the
justice had proceeded with the trial and a jury was impaneled
which returned a verdict of guilty and fixed his fine at $10.
It was shown that the justice was interested in the judgment
made up of fine and costs to the extent of $6, he being entitled
to $5 costs and $1 of the fine. The defendant's demurrer to the
petition was sustained by the circuit court. The judgment was
reversed by the Court of Appeals and citing Turmey v Ohvo it
directed the lower court to overrule the demurrer, pointing out
that the objection had been seasonably made, the trial could not
be appealed as the fine imposed was only $10, the justice had
directed the jury to enter a fine against the defendant and the
sum of $6 which the justice would receive as a result of the
judgment was not so small that it could be properly ignored
within the maxim De mimnnms iton curat lex.
To meet the situation created by these decisions, Kentucky,
in 1928, by appropriate legislation, provided that the fiscal
courts were to fix a reasonable compensation for the county
'Craig, Auditor of Public Accounts v. Shelton, 201 Ky 790, 258
S.W 694 (1924).
7 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 3360.
'KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 3356.
*222 Ky. 306, 300 S.W 918 (1927)
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judges for th.eir services in presiding in the final trials of
misdemeanor cases"° and made them ineligible to receive part
of the costs and fine as a fee. The sum taxed as costs was to be
paid by the county judge into the county treasury " This was
followed by legislation in 1932 which provided that justices of
2
were to be
the peace in counties of over 250,000 population"
compensated by a salary from the county and that the fees and
costs formerly due the justice must be paid to the county
treasury ' There is no ground for an objection where the fines
and costs are paid into a general fund, even though the salary
of the judge or justice may be paid out of the general fund, as
it is said that their relations to the fund are too remote to
warrant a presumption of bias toward convictions in prosecutions before them.'
The Kentucky Court in an early case on this subject,
pointed out that constitutional rights in the trial of misdemeanor cases may be waived by a defendant and where he fails
to object seasonably to being tried by the justice of the peace,
the latter may try him, and in the event of conviction tax the
costs against him as has been the custom for so many years in
the Commonwealth, maintaining that the cost statute was valid,
the justice does have jurisdiction to try such misdemeanor
cases, and that the sole ground on which the Tumey case rested
war that it was deprivation of the protection of the due process
clause where a trial was had after the defendant had obaected.1i
This interpretation of the decision in the Tumey case is contrary
to the one given by the lower federal courts. They have proceeded on the theory that the Supreme Court held that the
statutes creating jurisdiction and the procedure to be employed
were unconstitutional.' In Ex parte Baer " which involved an
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 25.260.
Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 453.030.
" Jefferson County only
"Ky. R. S. (1946) 64.250.
" Dugan v Ohio, 277 U. S. 61, 72 L. Ed. 784, 48 Sup. Ct. 439
(1928)
"5Adams, Judge v Slavin, 225 Ky. 135. 7 S.W 2d 836 (1928)
Accord, Tar v State, 117 Ohio St. 499, 159 N.E. 594 (1927) Bryant v
State. 146 Miss. 533, 112 So. 675 (1927).
10Ex parte Hatem, 38 F 2d 226 (1930) Ex parte Baer, 20 F 2d
912 (1927) see: Morgan v. United States, 32 F Supp. 546, 561-562
(1940).
" 20 F 2d 912 (1927), cited supra note 16.
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application for a writ of habeas corpus to the Federal District
Court of Eastern Kentucky by a defendant who had been convicted by a county judge of Kentucky, " the writ was granted
although the defendant had not objected to the county judge
trying the case and though he had been entitled to an appeal
and had failed to avail himself of this remedy The Federal
District Court of Western Kentucky in a later case denied the
writ under an almost identical set of facts but this denial was
based on the ground that the defendant had a right of appeal
to the circuit court where the defect of lack of due process
would have been cured by a trial de novo.'" The theory adopted
by the federal courts was upheld by dictum in one intervening
Kentucky decision which contained language to the effect that
the cost statute as applied to nusdemeanor cases is invalid and
the justice of the peace can not legally collect of a defendant,
convicted in his court, any fee whatsoever otherwise than by
agreement, acquiescence and grace. ' However, the subsequent
Kentucky decisions are based on the former theory
There seems to be little doubt but that the interpretation
given by the federal courts is the correct one. The Supreme
Court in the very first paragraph of the Tivmey opinion states.
that the question in the case is whether certain statutes providing
for the trial by the mayor deprives the accused of due process
of law because of the pecuniary and other interests which those
statutes give the mayor in the result of the trial." After reviewing the statutes involved the Court said
"Every procedure (writer's italics) which would
offer a possible temptation to the average man as a'
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
denies the latter due prccess of
the defendant
law "

Included in the review of the cases and authorities on
which the Court based its conclusion was Cooley's work on
Constitutional Lumitations. The Court quoted the following from

, 8 County judges were on the fee system at that time.
Ex parte Meeks, 20 F 2d 543 (1927)
SSee Shaw v Fox, County Judge, 246 Ky. 342, 353, 55 S.W
2d 11, 16 (1932).
-Williams v. Lueke, Justice of the Peace, 265 Ky. 84, 95 S.W
2d 1103 (1936).
-273 U. S. 510, 5.14, 71 L. Ed. 749, 751, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).
Id. at 532, 71 L. Ed. at 758.
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this work where, after referring to cases which hold that certain
interests do not disqualify a judge and explaimng that the
reason for such holding is that the interest is so remote, trifling
and insignificant that it would not influence a judge, Cooley
said
"But except in cases resting upon such reasons we
legislature can have any power to
do not see how the
abolish a maxim 4 which is among the fundamentals of
judicial authority "There has long been a split of authority as to whether the
interest of a judge renders the judgment void ' so that the
objection may not be waived or whether it is voidable' so that
the objection may be waived. Some of the authorities which
take the view that such a judgment is -voidable make an exception in eases of iiferior tribunals where there is no right of
appeal.'- The Court in the T'umey opinion does not prefer either
of the above views over the other. Instead of making a preference, it makes a distinction between the various interests that
might disqualify a judge and shows that neither rule can consistently be applied to all of these different interests.'9 It states
that all questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity, that matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, and remoteness of interest would generally seem to be
matters of legislative discretion, but that it certainly deprives
a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject
him to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in the case.' Admitting that the objection to trial
before a judge on ground of kinship, bias or certain other
-

No one ought to be a judge in his own cause.

'-273 U. S. 510, 532, 71 L. Ed. 749, 758, 47 Sup. Ct. 437,COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 873.

(1927),

' Taylor v. County Commissioners of Worcester, 105 Mass. 225

(1870)
(1871)
(1899).

Stockwell v. Township Board of White Lake, 22 Mich. 341
First National Bank v McGuire, 12 S.D. 226, 80 N.W 1074

' Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 3 H.L. Cas. 749 (1852)
Sampson v. People, 188 Ill. 592, 59 N.E. 427 (1901), Moses v. Julian,
45 N.H. 52 (1863)
''Moses v Julian, 45 N.H. 52 (1863) cited supra note 27" FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) sec. 329.
See Owens v. Dancy 36 F 2d 882, 884 (1929).
273 U. S. 510, 523, 71 L. Ed. 749, 754, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).
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interests may be waived, the Kentucky Court and others are in
error in applying this rule to the cases involving a direct,
substantial, personal peeumarv interest.
An objection by an accused in an examiinng court held by
a justice of the peace is not a valid one as he is not denied due
process of law inasmuch as the justice is paid for his services
out of the state treasury and therefore does not have a financial
interest in the outcome of the proceeding.3 1
In Wagers v Sizemore where the justice was proceeding
after a constitutional objection had been asserted and where the
punishment was such that it could not be appealed, the relief
granted was by way of injunction. In a later case, where relief
was sought by way of injunction before the judgment was
rendered and while the trial was still in progress the Court
indicated that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition
was the correct remedy 32 The writ of prohibition, in this type
of case, will not be granted by the circuit court because under
the Kentucky theory the justice is within his jurisdiction even
though lie is proceeding in error and the application for the
writ must therefore be. made to the Court of Appeals. 33 The
requisite for this writ is that great and irreparable injury
would be suffered by the applicant with no adequate remedy
open to hin. This requisite is met in cases of this nature where
the trial is still in progress and the punishment for the particular misdemeanor charged, as prescribed by statute, is such that
4
there is a possibility of it being nonappealable.3
Various methods have been used in attempts to circumvent
the effect of the Tuiney case. An agreement between a justice
and a city whereby the justice, who is disqualified by a misdemeanant's objection, transfers the case to a city judge in return
for part of the fine or costs which may be imposed, is illegal
"Martin, County Judge v Wyatt, 225 Ky. 212, 7 S.W 2d 1048
(1928).
1" Ibid.
'Williams v. Lueke, Justice of the Peace, 265 Ky. 84, 95 S.W
:2d 1103 (1936) cited supra note 21.
" See Adams Express Co. v Young, 184 Ky 49, 53, 211 S.W
407, 408 (1919), Williams v. Lueke, Justice of the Peace, 265 Ky. 84,
.88, 95 S.W 2d 1103, 1105 (1936), cited supra notes 21 and 33; KENTUCKY CRIMINAL CODE (Carroll, 1938) see. 362 provides that a judg-

ment for imprisonment or for a fine of twenty dollars or more is ap-

jpealable to the circuit court unless otherwise provided bNy statute.
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and void as against public policy 3 It has also been held that
the interest of a justice is not destroyed because another agrees
to be liable for the costs if the proceeding results in an acquittal. 3 6
There seems to be little possibility of a trial by a disinterested justice of the peace as the one presiding would always be
entitled to the fee of $2 for his services as provided by the cost
statute in the event of a conviction plus 10% of the fine im37
posed.
A private citizen who brings an action in the name of the
state as prescribed by statute is entitled to a portion of the fine
on conviction but the objection cannot be used by the accused m
this type of case as the pecuniary interest of the citizen does not
affect the judge and the citizen has no voice in the decision. 38
In some other states this constitutional objection has been
deemed inapplicable because of various reasons, such as the
smallness of the fees, the existence of other sources for their payment, and the safeguarding of the interests of the accused by
giving him rights to a change of venue, a jury trial, and an
appeal. 39 Little can be gained from reading the few Kentucky
decisions on this subject as regards the possibility of the Court
holding that the above reasons cure the defect of lack of due
process. In Wagers v Sizernore the court held that an interest
in the amount of $6 was not de minums and in view of the apparent attitude of the Appellate Court it seems that it would be
an extraordinary case where the costs were so small that the
de mamnus rule would be applied. This same case is the only one
ii which it can be determined that a jury was used and the
possibility of a jury curing the defect was not mentioned but
it should be noted that this could be considered an exceptional
case as the justice in addition to arguing the case to the jur-

'5 Howard v Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 54, 20 S.W 2d 1011 (1929).
"Ex parte Hatem, 38 F 2d 226 (1930) cited supra note 16.
' See Cole v Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 776, 780, 29 S.W 2d 32,
34 (1930) (County judge vacated the bench after an objection was.
made and called the nearest justice of the peace to hear the case.
The same objection was made to the justice and this was su'stained).
Froedge v Commonwealth, 21(9 Ky 168, 158 S.W 2d 426
(1942).
t
'See State v Shelton, 205 Ind. 416, 186 N.E. 772, 775 (1933),
Ex parte Lewis, 47 Okla. Cr. 72, 288 Pac. 354, 356 (1930).
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also directed a verdict against the defendant. It seems that a
jury trial would not cure the defect because the justice has the
right to control the introduction of evidence, including the right
to rule on the relevancy and materiality of questions propounded
40
by himself.
A change of venue as defined by the Kentucky Court
"means the transferring of a cause from a court in which
it was brought or is pending to another coordinate one." ' 4'. A
change of venue from a justice's court would necessarily be to
that of another justice of the peace and the same valid objection
42
could be made by the defendant.
In view of the fact that the Kentucky Criminal Code provides that on appeal from a justice's court the cause is to be
tried anew in the circuit court, as if no judgment had been entered below, 43 it seems certain that the right of appeal is a cure
for the defect in this state. Several cases have so held4 4 and it is
a settled principle of constitutional law that the entire judicial
procedure of a state is to be considered in determininm the sufficiency of due process.4 5
It may be concluded that while the inferior courts of Kentucky were seriously affected by the Tumey decision in 1927,
today, due to legislative changes, the effect is felt only by justices of the peace throughout the state with the exception of
Jefferson County The Kentucky Court holds that the justice
does have jurisdiction in these misdemeanor cases notwithstanding the Tumey case and in the event the objection is waived by
silence or otherwise or is not seasonably made, he may continue
the proceedings and on conviction tax the costs against the defendant. This is contrary to the view taken by the lower federal
courts which state that the statutes creating the jurisdiction
and procedure are unconstitutional and a violation of the due
"See Ex parte Kelly, 111 Tex. Cr. 57, 10 S.W 2d 728, 729 (1928).
"Pierce v Crisp, 267 Ky. 420, 102 S.W 2d 386 (1935)
42Ky.
R. S. (1946) sec. 452.360.
"KENTUCKY CRIMINAL CODE (Carroll, 1938) sec. 366.
"Ex parte Meeks, 20 F 2d 543 (1927), supra note 19; Hill v. State,
174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W 321 (1927).
"Moore v Dempsey 261 U. S. 86, 67 L. Ed. 543, 43 Sup. Ct. 265
(1922) Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969, 35 Sup. Ct.
582 (1914), Downer v Dunaway, 53 F 2d 586 (1931), Dunn v.
Lyons, 23 F 2d 14 (1928).
Law-6

430
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process clause. This wi'iter is of the opinion that the latter view
is the correct one and that it would be upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States on review. Although some other
states fail to uphold this constitutional objection due to various
reasons such as smallness of the fees, rights to a change of venue,
a jurv trial and an appeal, there is little reason to believe that
the Kentucky Court would be influenced by these reasons with
the exception of the right to appeal. The right to appeal should
cure the defect as the cause is tried de vovo in the circuit court.
If a justice continues the proceeding after a seasonable objection has been made, relief may be obtained by a writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals if the charge is such that
punislnent may be given from which there can be no appeal.
FRA]\K K. WARNOCK.

